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We conducted a large stakes insurance experiment with small probabilities of losses and a
realistic form of ambiguity. Our results demonstrate that worry plays a more important role in the
decision to consider insurance against high losses that are rare than does subjective probability
estimates. For those who do have an interest in buying insurance, worry is also positively related
to the willingness to pay (WTP) for coverage. If faced with an ambiguous risk, an individual is
more willing to consider insurance and pay higher amounts than when the probability of a loss is
specified precisely. An approximately 1,000-fold increase in the ambiguous probability did not
change the percentage of those who consider insurance and had a very small positive impact on
WTP. Our results provide insights into the low probability insurance puzzle where some
individuals are willing to pay too much and others nothing for coverage in relation to the risk
associated with the specific event.
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Introduction
Imagine you are facing a risk that is characterized by a very small probability of
occurrence but, if it occurs, will cause significant damage relative to your total wealth. Examples
of such risks are floods and earthquakes, as well as fire and theft. If you were offered insurance
coverage against such a risk would you try to estimate the probability and multiply this figure by
the value or utility of the potential loss? What role would affect or emotional factors such as
worry play in your decision with respect to specific outcomes?
Understanding insurance decisions with respect to low-probability disasters has been a
challenge for psychologists as well as economists. Field studies and controlled laboratory
experiments have posed the following low probability insurance puzzle: (1) many individuals do
not voluntarily purchase coverage even when premiums are highly subsidized (Kunreuther, 1978;
Slovic, Fischhoff, Lichtenstein, Corrigan, & Combs, 1978). (2) In a controlled experiment consistent with these earlier studies, McClelland, Schulze, and Coursey (1993) showed that most
individuals are either unwilling to pay a penny for low-probability insurance or far too much
when compared with the expected loss from the event. The early version of prospect theory
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) takes this feature into account by having a discontinuity in the
probability weighting function close to zero.
Most earlier studies in decision making including the above-mentioned ones have focused
on explaining deviations from the predictions derived from normative models of choice such as
(subjective) expected utility theory (Savage, 1954; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947). Only
recently has behavioral decision theory concerned itself with the impact that affect and emotion
have on decision making with respect to protective measures (see, e.g., Hogarth & Kunreuther,
1995; Baron, Hershey & Kunreuther, 2000; Hsee & Kunreuther, 2000; Rottenstreich & Hsee,
2

2001; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welsh,
2001). Affect and emotions seem to be especially important with respect to decisions involving
uncertain outcomes with large consequences (Slovic et al., 2002; Loewenstein et al., 2001).
This paper analyzes how individuals’ willingness to pay (WTP) for insurance against real
high-stakes losses is related to calculations based on probabilities and/or emotional factors such
as a person’s worry regarding the outcome. Caplin and Leahy (2001) suggest that worry is a
plausible anticipatory emotion associated with potential losses. MacLeod, Williams, and
Bekerian (1991, p. 478) note that “worry is […being] concerned with future events where there is
uncertainty about the outcome, the future being thought about is a negative one, and this is
accompanied by feelings of anxiety”. Both of these definitions of worry are relevant to the
feeling someone may have when considering whether to purchase insurance coverage and if so
how much to pay for a policy.
Krantz and Kunreuther (2007) have argued that an important goal that individuals pursue
when making decisions on whether to buy insurance is peace of mind. The importance of this
type of non-monetary utility has also been demonstrated in an earlier empirical study by Hogarth
and Kunreuther (1995). When individuals where asked to report on the arguments they ‘had with
themselves’ in deciding whether or not to buy a warranty, peace of mind proved to be the most
important reason. Equating peace of mind with the absence of worry, we contend that the more
worried an individual may be, the greater the interest is in purchasing insurance and the more one
should be willing to pay as a way of reducing her worries and obtaining peace of mind in the
process.
We examine these issues through a controlled experiment using an incentive-compatible,
real payments mechanism: Individuals are asked to state their maximum willingness to pay for
3

insurance facing an unknown selling price that is concealed in an envelope. Such a mechanism is
expected to elicit a price that is equal to the utility of insurance for the individual because it is
mathematically equivalent to a random-price mechanism (Becker, DeGroot, & Marschak, 1964).
The probability of a loss is very low and it is either specified precisely or there is ambiguity
regarding the estimate (i.e., number of rainy days in a particular city during a prespecified time
period). By eliciting the degree of worry, our investigation enables one to take a small but
important step towards solving the low probability insurance puzzle. Understanding why some
people would not pay anything for insurance while others volunteer an amount far greater than
their expected loss requires one to look at the two stages of the decision: (1) whether one has an
interest in purchasing insurance (i.e. WTP> 0) and if so (2) how much one is willing to pay.
Kunreuther (1978) has also referred to a two-stage decision when interpreting behavior with
small probability disasters. Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968) demonstrate the existence of a twostage process where individuals determine the general attractiveness of a lottery in the first stage
and then decide on their exact bid or rating of the lottery in the second stage.
Two-stage explanations have also been suggested in consumer behavior where the
decision on whether to purchase an item is influenced by different variables than the decision on
how much to spend (Jones, 1989; Melenberg & van Soest, 1996). In analyzing individuals’
cigarette consumption in the UK, Jones (1989) finds that the decision to smoke is qualitatively
different from the decision on how much to smoke. Individuals who believe that smoking is more
harmful than drinking are less likely to start smoking; for those who do smoke, this belief
regarding the dangers of smoking relative to alcohol consumption does not significantly reduce
average cigarette consumption. In a similar spirit, Melenberg and van Soest (1996) analyze
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vacation expenditures of Dutch families and find that a person’s income level has a different
effect on whether to take a vacation than on how much to spend if one decides to take a vacation.
Our results are consistent with earlier findings on decisions with respect to low
probability disasters. A substantial percentage of individuals are not willing to pay anything for
insurance. Those who consider buying coverage are willing to pay significantly more than the
expected loss whether the likelihood of a loss of given amount is specified precisely or is
ambiguous. We show that under conditions of ambiguity, worry is more important than
subjective probability estimates for determining those individuals who are willing to pay a
positive amount for insurance. For those who are interest in buying insurance, worry is the most
important driver for understanding how much one is willing to pay for coverage. If we increase
the ambiguous probability by a factor of approximately 1,000, the percentage of those who
consider insurance does not change, and we observe only a minimal positive impact on their
WTP, whilst worry remains an important driver of behavior. Finally, worry is an important factor
when considering insurance and specifying WTP if the probability of a loss is specified precisely.
Our study thus provides additional evidence on the impact of emotional factors as drivers of
choices under conditions of risk and ambiguity. Moreover, the extreme behaviors positing the
low probability insurance puzzle defined above can be partially attributed to differences in
individuals’ worry with respect to the possibility of a loss. When the probability is ambiguous
rather than well-specified, an individual is more likely to consider insurance and be willing to pay
a large amount for coverage.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section offers a detailed explanation of our
experimental design. The following section reports our results. The last two sections contain a
general discussion and implications of our findings for policy makers.
5

Experimental design and sample
Sample
A total of 263 students from a major German university participated in the experiment.
They were recruited via email, posters, and short presentations in classrooms. They were told that
the experiment would take 90 minutes, that all participants would receive 10 DM for sure, and
that there was a small chance (not specified) that they would earn 2,000 DM at the end of the
experiment.1 The study was carried out in groups of six to ten students each of whom was
situated in a separate booth. Nine of the 263 subjects had to be excluded because of nonsensical
responses.2,3
Basic features and experimental conditions
Objects at stake: Participants were told that they had inherited either a painting or a
sculpture and each received a small photo of the art object with an individual identification
number. It was announced that only one painting and one sculpture were originals, worth 2,000
DM; if it was a forgery then it had zero value. All participants learned that one person in the

1

At the time of the experiment, the 2,000 DM was worth US $1,086.48.

2

Of the 254 usable responses, 54.5% were female, 45.5% male. The largest groups were psychology

(29.9%) and business (28.7%) majors followed by economics (5.1%), pedagogic sciences (4.7%), law and German
(each group 3.9%), and sociology (3.5%) students. The remaining 20.3% of the subjects were majoring in 18
different fields of study. The average age of the participants was 25.6.
3

Subjects were excluded from the analysis mostly because they wanted to pay more for insurance than the

value of the object to be insured – an (inherited) painting or sculpture (see below) – or because they clearly
misunderstood the experimental situation (derived from open-ended questions) i.e. assumed they were paying for the
(inherited) painting (or sculpture) rather than the insurance policy.
6

experiment would have the original painting and one would have the original sculpture. These
individuals would be determined by random draws. This is an extreme form of the random pay
mechanism suggested and investigated by Bolle (1990).
Nature of the risks, experimental conditions, and timing: The original painting or
sculpture was threatened by fire and theft. Participants were offered insurance protection against
a potential loss of 2,000 DM. It was made clear that the insurer would only sell a policy to the
owner of the original art object, and that insurance purchased by others would be hypothetical
and not affect their final wealth level. In other words only the owner of the original painting or
sculpture would have to pay for coverage. We made it clear that it was in everyone’s best interest
to anticipate being the owner of the respective original art object when determining the maximum
amount they would be willing to pay for an insurance policy. In addition to providing written
instructions a flow diagram was presented to subjects describing the key variables and the
decisions they had to make. All questions were answered, and the procedure was explained again
when necessary. The Appendix contains the most significant part of the instructions.4
In part A of the experiment each participant inherited a painting. The original was
threatened by the following ambiguous risk: The painting was declared to be stolen if it would
rain exactly 24 days in July in the current year at the Frankfurt Airport; a fire occurs and destroys
the painting if it would rain exactly 23 days in August.5 Subjects knew that the actual outcome
would only be determined after data on the number of days with precipitation in July and August
were obtained from the Frankfurt airport. The experiment was carried out in the spring of 1999.
4
5

The complete set of instructions is available from the authors upon request
Students were informed that a day is defined as a rain day by the weather station in Frankfurt if there is

more than one millimeter of rain that day.
7

We define ambiguity as a state of mind in which the decision maker perceives difficulties
in estimating the relevant probabilities.6 Whereas rain frequencies may be precisely estimated by
meteorologists, they will be ambiguous for most if not all the participants in the experiment. This
situation was designed to resemble a real-life risk (e.g. of a fire or theft in one’s home) where
insurers estimate annual loss probabilities across all policyholders but the individual homeowner
views these risks as ambiguous.
On the basis of actual Frankfurt weather data from the year 1870 to the present, we
estimated the probability of each of these events occurring to be approximately 1 in 10,000.7 In
Group 1, respondents were informed about both hazards threatening the original painting: theft
and fire, but were not told the chances that either theft or fire would occur except that it was
equal to the chance of the above rain frequencies in July and August in Frankfurt respectively .
Respondents were then asked to state their maximum WTP first for theft insurance and then for
fire coverage. Group 2 differed only in that respondents were asked to state their maximum WTP
for one insurance policy covering both fire and theft damage. Risks were however still presented
separately.

6

Ambiguity is defined as a subjective phenomenon in the spirit of work on comparative ignorance by Fox

and Tversky (1995) and Fox and Weber (2002).
7

Rain frequencies were analyzed for consistency with different distribution forms for random events, e.g.

normal, binomial. Rain frequencies were consistent with a Poisson distribution (KS-test of deviation: not
significant.). Lousy weather like this was fortunately never experienced in the period from 1870 to today in
Frankfurt. Since the ‘base rate’ for rain in July and August is different, 24 days of rain in July have the same
probability of occurrence than 23 days of rain in August.
8

In Group 3 respondents were informed that the risk of theft was based on 24 rainy days in
July. They then had to state their maximum WTP for theft insurance. They only learned
afterwards that a second risk, fire, was also threatening the painting and went through the same
procedure with respect to this risk (based on 23 rainy days in August). This experimental
manipulation between the three groups (bundling, unbundling, and stepwise selling) was
designed to increase our understanding as to how insurance against very low-probability events
might be marketed. It was unrelated to the research questions motivating this paper and will not
be analyzed here.8
In part B of the experiment the participants in Groups 1 and 2 were subject to the same
treatments as in Part A. The only difference was that a sculpture (instead of a painting) was
threatened by theft and fire, each of which was specified as having a probability of 1 in 10,000 of
occurring. To determine whether a fire had occurred two random draws with replacement were
taken from a bingo cage containing 100 balls. The same procedure was followed to determine
whether a theft occurred.9 Group 3 had a 1 in 10 ambiguous chance of either fire or theft in part
B. (i.e., theft occurs if there is rain during exactly 12 days in July; fire occurs if there is rain
during exactly 11 days in August). We used this relatively high value to see whether or not there
were differences in people’s decision processes between this situation and the case where the
probability was 1 in 10,000. The experimental design is depicted in Table 1.
8 The individuals in Group 3A only learned about a second risk after stating WTP for the first risk in
contrast to Groups 1A and 2A where the individuals learned about both risks before stating their WTP. In group 3A,
individuals were willing to pay a large amount for the first risk but then reduced their WTP for the second risk. The
sum of WTP was significantly below what was observed in groups 1A and 2A. Hence it was inappropriate to merge
group 3A with groups 1A and 2A.
9 A theft or fire was assumed to occur if the number 1 was pulled out twice from the bingo cage.
9

Insert table 1 about here
Note that the ambiguous low-probability situation is always presented first. If we had
initially presented the exact probabilities scenario to some of the respondents, they might have
anchored on this figure when estimating the likelihood of rain in Frankfurt, potentially distorting
our results on ambiguity. There was no feedback at all between parts A and B of the experiment
so that respondents could not learn anything from the situation presented in A when they made a
decision in B.
Eliciting WTP for insurance: There were no fixed selling prices for the insurance
policies. Instead, we utilized a modified Becker, DeGroot and Marschak (BDM) (1964) mechanism for eliciting maximum WTP values. This modified mechanism was first introduced in
laboratory research by Schade and Kunreuther (2001) and has recently been used in the
marketing literature to reveal reservation prices at the point of purchase (Wang, Venkatesh, &
Chatterjee, 2007). Reservation prices reflect an individual’s highest willingness to pay such that
the net utility of purchasing is zero. In the original BDM-procedure, respondents face a random
draw of selling prices for the respective object and are informed about the distribution of these
prices. In theory it is incentive-compatible to state prices as being equal to reservation prices
under these conditions, but there are practical problems in utilizing this method (Becker et al.,
1964).
When utilizing the standard BDM procedure for eliciting reservation prices for insurance
against our risky prospect, decision makers might have treated the resulting two-stage as a one-
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stage lottery but in an erroneous way as discussed by Safra, Segal, & Spivak (1990).10 Prespecified intervals of WTP in the original BDM may also serve as anchors, thus biasing
individuals’ estimates (Bohm, Lindén, & Sonnegard, 1997). Such a bias is precluded by our
procedure since the actual selling prices for each of the insurance policies were inserted in sealed
envelopes to be opened only after the experiment was conducted. This undisclosed price was
selected before the start of the experiment on the basis of pretest results with respect to WTP, so
that about one half of the respondent’s bids could be expected to be higher than the predetermined price.
The mechanism was carefully explained to the subjects so that they understood that it was
designed to elicit their maximum willingness to pay. We noted that if they bid too high they
might actually pay that price for insurance should they be the owner of the original art object and
regret having made such a high offer. If they bid too low they may not qualify for insurance even
though they would have been willing to purchase coverage at a higher price than their stated
value. Respondents were then asked to write their maximum willingness to pay for the respective
insurance policy on a piece of paper and place it in an envelope.
Eliciting subjective probability estimates: After stating maximum buying prices for
insurance, respondents were then asked to estimate the probability of each of the ambiguous
risks. We distributed tables with likelihoods of a loss ranging from certainty to 1 in 10,000,000.
Respondents were first asked to mark the probability of a fire or theft causing a loss in one of 15
intervals (e.g. the chance was between 1 in 5,000 and 1 in 10,000). Respondents could also
10 According to standard expected utility theory, respondents are allowed to reduce a two-stage to a onestage lottery by multiplying through the probabilities. However, individuals are known to make errors when doing
this. In addition, behavior towards a two-stage lottery might differ from behavior towards a one-stage lottery.
11

indicate that the risk was less than 1 in 10,000,000. After they checked one of the intervals, they
were then asked for their best point estimate of a probability of a loss. The probability table is
included in the Appendix.
Eliciting the level of worry: As part of the experiment all subjects were asked the
following question for parts A and B of the experiment:
“How worried were you to be the owner of the original painting (sculpture) and then lose
the money again?”11
Worry was not defined, specified or decomposed into elements of the problem such as
magnitude of loss or likelihood of loss. We kept the question more general so as to elicit the
emotional state of the respondent – and hence indirectly measuring the importance of peace of
mind when the person faced a given scenario. Answers were based on a 10-point rating scale with
1= not worried at all, to 10= very worried.

11 This is a translation of the following question in German: “Wie besorgt waren Sie, der Besitzer des
echten Gemäldes zu sein und das Geld wieder zu verlieren?”
12

Experimental results
Basic considerations
We begin with a descriptive analysis of WTP for insurance for ambiguous and wellspecified loss probabilities. We continue with descriptive and regression analyses of the impact
of subjective probabilities and individuals’ worry on their choices.
Distribution of WTP: inconsistent with expected utility maximization?
To determine the proportion of subjects who state a maximum WTP that is consistent with
expected utility maximization, we divided the responses into three groups: (1) WTP = 0, (2)
responses clearly consistent with what would be expected if individuals maximized expected
utility: 0 < WTP  10 E(loss), and (3) WTP > 10 E(loss). With exact probabilities, the last group
would have to be extremely risk averse to be consistent with an expected utility model. With
ambiguity, individuals could also be overestimating the loss probability (see below). E(loss) is
approximately 0.40 DM in our experiment for the small probabilities.12 Therefore, the cutoff
point between intervals (2) and (3) is 4.00 DM. With large ambiguous probabilities, E(loss) is
approximately 380 DM.13
When the likelihood of the event was ambiguous, only 2 individuals (1.2% of N) were
located in the interval between .5 and 5 E(Loss) and 137 individuals (81.5% of N) were willing to
pay more than 5 times E(Loss). The values of WTP varied between 0 DM and 1690 DM.

12 The exact value is 0.39998 DM since the aggregate probability of a loss of 2,000DM is 0.00019999 or 1
in 5000.25.
13 The aggregate probability of a loss of 2,000 DM is approximately 0.19 or 1 in 5.26.
13

The findings for ambiguous and exact loss probabilities (Groups 1 and 2) are reported in
table 2. When the probability of the two events was 1 in 5,000, most respondents either do not
want to pay anything for insurance or are willing to pay incredibly high premiums. For those
individuals having a WTP greater than 10 times E(loss), the mean premium is approximately 588
times the E(loss) if probabilities are ambiguous and approximately 315 times the E(loss) if
probabilities are known exactly. For Group B with a known risk of 1/5000, we can conclude that
most respondents’ behavior is highly inconsistent with expected utility [E(U)] theory.
Insert table 2 about here
The picture changes when the ambiguous risk is 1/5. There was still a group of individuals
who had no interest in purchasing insurance (i.e. WTP =0) and this is hard to explain on the basis
of expected utility theory. However, the remaining 84% all specified prices that were consistent
with an E(U) theory. Note from Table 2 that with small probabilities, the mean WTP for
insurance is more than double if the probability information is ambiguous rather than wellspecified. In the same vein for the low probability case, only 17 percent of those with ambiguous
probability information had WTP= 0 compared to 35 percent when the risk was specified. The
differences in absolute WTP and proportion who were unwilling to pay anything for insurance
differ significantly between ambiguous and precise probabilities (the t-values are 4.6 and 3.8,
respectively).
We now analyze whether respondents in Groups 1 or 2 who specified WTP = 0 for at least
one scenario differed when they were presented with ambiguous and exact probabilities. Each
individual can only be situated in one of the four cells of table 3: WTP = 0 for ambiguous and
exact probabilities; WTP = 0 for ambiguous probabilities and WTP > 0 for exact probabilities,
14

WTP = 0 for exact probabilities and WTP > 0 for ambiguous probabilities and WTP > 0 in both
situations.
As shown in Table 3, approximately twice as many individuals (59 versus 29) do not want
to pay anything for insurance if the risk is precisely specified than if the risk is perceived to be
ambiguous. Furthermore, only one person who specified WTP = 0 for an ambiguous risk has a
WTP>0 for insurance with exact probabilities. The other 28 individuals in this group also specify
WTP = 0 for the risk with exact probabilities. On the other hand, 31 of the 59 individuals with
WTP = 0 for an exact probability specify WTP > 0 if the risk is ambiguous. Stated another way,
having a positive WTP with exact probabilities implies (with one exception) having a positive
WTP with ambiguous probabilities. On the other hand, WTP > 0 when the risk is ambiguous does
not imply having WTP>0 with exact probabilities. This finding suggests that respondents are
ambiguity averse.

Impact of loss probabilities versus worry on WTP for insurance
Descriptive analysis of the impact of worry and subjective probabilities: Can one ascribe
the difference between individuals not interested in buying insurance (i.e. WTP=0) and those who
want coverage (i.e. WTP>0) to differences between their subjective probability judgments and/or
their level of worry? Table 4 reports on mean worry ratings for ambiguous and exact probabilities
when the actual risk is very low and for ambiguous probabilities when the risk is high. Mean
subjective probability judgments are compared between small and large ambiguous risks in Table
5.
Insert tables 4 and 5 about here
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On average, worry is significantly higher for those individuals who are willing to
purchase insurance (WTP>0) than those who had no interest in coverage (WTP =0) for both large
and small perceived probabilities as well as for exact probabilities (Table 4). With respect to the
ambiguous risks, probability judgments are higher for those with WTP>0, but this difference is
only marginally significant (one-sided) when the ambiguous risk is low and almost identical
when the ambiguous risk is high.14 (Table 5). These findings already suggest that worry is more
important than probability of a loss in determining whether a person is willing to purchase
insurance. Furthermore, probability judgments are not significantly correlated with the decision
of people to consider insurance15 and only weakly correlated with their WTP, provided they
consider insurance16.
Table 5 also shows the immense difficulties people have in judging small probabilities.
The low ambiguous risk of 1 / 5000 was on average believed to be a risk of 1 / 15. This is an
overestimation by a factor of 333. The high ambiguous risk of 1 / 5 was, however, slightly
underestimated with 1 / 7 on average. Although probability judgments are higher in the high risk
treatment than in the low risk treatment by a factor of 2 on average, the actual risks differed by a
factor of 1,000. Clearly, the subjects did a particularly poor job in judging the likelihood of a very
small risk and were much better calibrated in estimating the high risk.
14 The mean probabilities for the ambiguity high risk case was 15.3% when WTP=0 and 16.6% when
WTP>0.
15 We constructed a dummy variable that takes a value of one if people have a WTP>0 and a value of zero
otherwise. The Pearson correlation coefficient between this dummy and the subjective probability judgments is 0.08
(78% significance with N=243)
16 The Pearson correlation coefficient between subjective probability judgments and WTP for those
subjects with WTP>0 is 0.14 (96% significant with N=208).
16

This pattern is consistent with Einhorn and Hogarth’s (1985) ambiguity model that is
based on the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic and mental simulations. With very small
probabilities, there is no room for downward adjustments but considerable room for
overestimating probability. With large subjective ambiguous probabilities, however, downwards
as well as upwards mental simulations are feasible, which is likely to produce a more accurate
estimate of the probability.
Another explanation for this difference could be a person’s past experience. Individuals
should be better in estimating a probability when they have experienced the respective part of the
distribution – 11 or 12 days of monthly precipitation in the summer is a normal event whereas 23
or 24 days would require an individual to have a lifespan (on average) of some 10,000 years to
experience the event just once.
To be consistent with an E(U) model one could contend that individuals having a positive
WTP significantly overestimate the probabilities for very low probability events that are
ambiguous and actually use these estimates in their decisions. For large ambiguous probabilities
individuals would also have to base their WTP for insurance partially on their subjective
probability estimates of a loss to be consistent with expected utility theory and again use these
estimates to determine WTP. We will examine whether individuals behave in this way by
undertaking regression analyses with respect to their decisions regarding their interest in
purchasing insurance and the amount they are willing to pay for coverage.
Comparing the impact of probabilities and worry using regression analysis
Before undertaking these regression analyses we checked to make sure that there was no
multicollinearity between worry and subjective probabilities (i.e. worry could be the consequence
17

of subjective probabilities or subjective probabilities could be influenced by different levels of
worry). Table 6 reveals that neither of these relationships noted above is statistically significant
for the group of individuals having a positive WTP for insurance and for individuals with
WTP=0. The overall correlation between worry and subjective probability judgments is 0.08
(0.19 significance level with N=243).
Insert table 6 about here
In undertaking the regression analysis, we used so-called threshold models that separately
analyze whether respondents consider insurance at all (i.e. if their WTP=0) and the magnitude of
their WTP if they do consider insurance (i.e. regression on WTP for those with WTP >0). A
simple OLS regression is not suitable because WTP is truncated at 0, and many observations are
located at this extreme point. In practice, our strategy corresponds to estimating a Probit model
for the participation decision with a binary dependent variable taking on a value of 0 if WTP=0
and a value of 1 if WTP>0. We then undertake an OLS regression on WTP for those subjects
who consider insurance. Under certain plausible assumptions17, this approach is consistent with
the more general class of threshold models that are, in turn, based on the so-called Tobit model
(Tobin, 1956; see also Melenberg & van Soest, 1996; Jones, 1989). Threshold models are more
general than Tobit models because they allow parameters to have different effects on the two

17 One can estimate the two equations of a threshold model separately if the error term in the OLS
regression is independent from the participation decision. The general requirement for the identification of both
regression equations is that the error term has a mean of zero and is strictly independent of the variables on the right
hand side of the equation. Our robustness checks using panel methods, for which these assumptions are not critical,
lead to qualitatively identical results.
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parts of the model. We choose this approach because we wanted to allow for different decision
processes in each stage of the person’s decision process.18
We are particularly interested in comparing the relative effects of probability judgments
and worry. Hence, we estimated three different model specifications for each the binary probits
and the OLS regressions. Model (1) only includes probability judgments (values range from
2/10,000,000 to 4/5). Model (2) only includes worry (values ranging from 1 to 9). Model (3)
includes both probability judgments and worry. We always added a dummy labeled separate
policies to control for the effect of our bundling manipulation and a high risk dummy which
reflects the difference between high and low ambiguous risks. The results of the six regressions
are reported in Table 7.19
Insert table 7 about here

18 We ran Tobit models – not discriminating between the two stages – as a benchmark and found that they
do not compare favorably with the more general threshold models in terms of model fit and explanatory power.
Using the same parameters as in Table 7 (below), the R2 of the Tobit models ranged from 0.00 to 0.02 and the
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) ranged from 1,974 to 3,122. Both measures are very poor fits compared to the
separate regressions. Without separating between the ‘considering insurance’ and WTP stages one loses most of the
explanatory power with respect to characterizing the decision on whether to purchase insurance and how much to
pay for coverage.
19 We also ran a random effects threshold model on Group 1 and Group 2, simultaneously analyzing the
ambiguity and exact probability for the low risk treatments within-subjects. Such a model can be criticized on the
grounds that exact probabilities provided by the experimenter and subjective probabilities provided by the
respondents are treated as the same type of variable. This analysis, on the other hand, controls for unobserved
heterogeneity of the individuals and confirms the findings reported here.
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We compare the three ‘considering insurance’ models by examining their goodness of fit
statistics (pseudo R2), log likelihood and Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).20 Explaining the
decision on whether to purchase insurance on the basis of probability judgments (Model 1a)
yields a very low pseudo R2 and fails the most basic specification test for a regression which
probes if all coefficients are jointly zero, i.e. the null hypothesis that the model does not explain
the dependent variable at all. According to this test, probability judgments, an increase in the
underlying risk by a factor of 1,000 and the way insurance is sold (separately or bundled) do not
contribute to explaining why subjects consider buying insurance (Prob > Chi2 = 0.42).
Model (1b), which includes worry instead of probability judgments, has a much better
explanatory power and the worry variable is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. .
The pseudo R2 in this model is 10% versus only 1% in model 1a.21 Incorporating probability
judgments and worry (Model 1c) diminishes pseudo R2 marginally, but improves the log
likelihood and the AIC. The coefficients on probability judgments and the high ambiguity risk
treatment remain insignificant, while the worry coefficient is highly significant. However,
probability judgments do improve the model fit somewhat. Yet, the large improvement in model
fit compared to model 1a comes from the inclusion of worry. Hence, worry is relatively more

20 An increase in pseudo R2 and the log-likelihood indicate an increase in model fit. Adding additional
parameters in a regression model always increases the fit, independent of the true number of relevant parameters. In
contrast, the AIC does not only consider the fit of a model, but also its parsimony and “punishes” for model
complexity. The preferred model is the one with the lowest AIC and it optimizes the trade-off between parsimony
and fit.
21 Log likelihood and AIC are, however, worse than in model 1a for the ‘technical’ reason that the constant
in model 1a is closer to the sample mean than in model 2a.
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important for determining insurance decisions than probability judgments or variations in the
actual probability of a loss from 1/5000 to 1/5.
Regressions 2a-c look only at WTP for those who consider insurance. We compare model
fit using adjusted R2, which also penalizes for including additional parameters.22 The worry
model (2b) has a larger adjusted R2 than the subjective probabilities model (2a), which implies
that worry explains more variance than subjective probability judgments even if one focuses only
on those individuals who consider purchasing insurance. However, in contrast to model 1a, the
adjusted R2 is 3% for the subjective probability model and probability judgments are statistically
significant. In other words, probability judgments matter for WTP for those who consider buying
insurance. The joint model 2c slightly improves the adjusted R2 compared to 2b and both
probability judgments at the 90% confidence level and worry remains statistically significant at
the 95% confidence level.23
We conducted further robustness checks of our results by repeating all regression analyses
using natural logs of probability judgments to see if the results are driven by extreme values.
Doing so leaves our results qualitatively unchanged, except that probability judgments are also
not significant anymore in the WTP regressions, also if natural logs of WTP are considered as

22 Adjusted R2 measures are not available for models estimated by log-likelihood, e.g. logit or probit, and
the AIC is not available for models estimated by OLS. However, both test statistics are similar in purpose.
23 Although not central to our analysis, Table 7 reveals that the ‘separate policies’ variable is statistically
insignificant in the ‘considering insurance’ part, but is marginally significant and negatively impacts the value of
WTP for those interested in purchasing insurance. Insurance policies that bundle coverage against different risks
impacting on an object generate a larger WTP than the sum of WTP for policies that separately cover the risks.
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dependent variable. Apparently, the explanatory power of probability judgments is very limited
while worry is positively related to considering insurance and WTP.
Behavior with large ambiguous probabilities of losses: Another important result from the
analyses reported in Table 7 is that the high risk dummy is not significant in any of the
regressions and its sign is in the wrong direction. Increasing the ambiguous probability of a loss
by a factor of approximately 1,00024 does not significantly change the decision to consider
insurance or the willingness to pay. We can rule out that the effect of enlarging the loss
probability is fully captured in the worry and subjective probabilities variables based on
additional regressions we ran that only included a dummy for the high-risk treatment as
explanatory variable for considering insurance and WTP. The estimated coefficients in both
models are insignificant and the models did not pass H0 that the coefficients are zero.
The descriptive statistics also show that this high increase in ambiguous loss probability
does not have much of an effect. The percentage of those generally interested in insurance is 83%
for the low and 84% for the high ambiguous probability, and average WTP of the interested
individuals is 253 DM for the high and 230 DM for the low ambiguous probability. These
differences are extremely small given that the expected value of the insurance policy increased
from 0.4 DM to 380 DM. Such findings do not square with predictions by any model of choice
where risk estimates play the central role. Despite the fact that the subjective probability
estimates in the two cases differ significantly (see Table 5), neither WTP for insurance nor level
of worry differ by very much from the small probability cases.

24 The exact increase is 950; from 1 in 5,000.25 to 1 in 5.26. This results from the probability calculus with
disjoint events.
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We have shown in the regressions that worry appears to be the dominant driver of WTP.
Since individuals’ worry is not different for Group 3B than Groups 1A and 2A, even though the
loss probability is much larger, it is not surprising that mean WTP is approximately the same for
both groups. Even though the subjective probability estimates are more than twice as high for
Group 3B than Groups 1A and 2A, it has little impact on the mean WTP difference between the
two groups.
Impact of worry with precise probabilities: One could argue that worry is only important
if probabilities are ambiguous. If this would be the case, worry should lose its impact if exact
probabilities are provided. This is not the case, as shown in Table 8 which uses only observations
from the treatments with known small probabilities of a loss (groups 1B and 2B). The regressions
reveal that worry remains an important driver of the decision to consider insurance and WTP. In
fact, the Pseudo-R2 and the AIC for consideration are very high.

Insert table 8 about here
Illustrating the impact of worry: We finish our results section by demonstrating that as a
person’s level of worry increases, he or she is willing to pay considerably more for insurance.
Table 9 depicts the findings for those whose WTP >0 based on the following groupings of the
worry variable which ranges from 1 to 10; 1: no worry, 2: very low worry,:3-5: low worry, 6-9:
high worry, 10: very high worry. Of the 168 respondents in this group, 69 are not worried at all or
have very low worry in the treatment with known risks and their mean WTP is 7 DM. This is still
18 times higher than the expected value of the insurance. So worry, although a strong determinant
of WTP is still not the entire story. Instead, there appear to be some unobserved characteristics of
people such as the need for insurance to satisfy other goals that accounts for the high values of
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WTP. Turning to the worry variable, the mean WTP estimates for those in the high and extremely
high worry groups are respectively 20 and 30 times higher than the mean WTP for the no and low
worry group. Similarly, under ambiguous probabilities the group with the highest level of worry
is willing to pay almost 5 times more for insurance than the group with no or very low worry.
Insert table 9 about here

General Discussion
The above experiments suggest that subjective estimates of ambiguous probabilities play
a minor role in explaining when individuals may be interested in buying insurance and the
amount they are willing to pay for coverage. Other authors have reported on findings that are
consistent with this result. Huber, Wider, and Huber (1997) have experimentally demonstrated
that in naturalistic decision tasks, probabilities are used far less than expected from classical
decision theory. In their experiments, most individuals do not request probability information
before making their decisions even though they could have obtained this information.
With small probabilities, there is strong evidence from the experimental literature that
with very small exact probabilities, individuals have a hard time understanding their meaning and
are considerably insensitive to variations of their level (Kunreuther, Novemsky, & Kahneman,
2001). In their experiments, individuals’ perception of the safety of a chemical facility did not
differ when the risks of a serious industrial accident varied between 1 in 100,000, 1 in 1,000,000,
and 1 in 10,000,000 (Kunreuther et al., 2001). We extend this finding and demonstrate that at
least for ambiguous risks, even large probabilities such as 1 in 5 may not lead to different
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insurance decisions than probabilities of 1 in 5,000. We cannot judge from our experiments,
however, whether this would still hold for known probabilities of 1 in 5 vs. 1 in 5,000 since we
did not vary known probabilities. With respect to the consideration of insurance and WTP for
coverage, we would expect that variations of known probabilities in this interval would make a
large difference in behavior.
Sunstein (2003) has coined the term probability neglect. He refers to a number of
experimental studies where people are quite insensitive to changes of probabilities (with an
overlap with those referenced, here) and adds evidence from a study on cancer risk he had carried
out at the University of Chicago. In this study, individuals’ WTP to eliminate the cancer risk only
increased by a factor of about two when the probability was ten times higher. He also reports on
anecdotal evidence for peoples’ strong emotional reactions after terrorist acts; individuals seem to
focus on the potential event rather than its likelihood. In his opinion, this is the main reason why
the public demands a substantial governmental response to terrorist acts. Our results indicate that
his view might also hold in settings were the stakes are high but clearly far below the potential
consequences of a terrorist act.
Our results suggest that the low probability insurance puzzle can be explained by focusing
on the role that worry plays in people’s decisions. More specifically the data indicate that those
who are more worried about suffering a loss will be more likely to purchase insurance and pay
more for coverage than those who are less worried. Obtaining peace of mind is worth a lot if one
is highly worried.
The effect of ambiguity on behavior has been studied systematically since Daniel
Ellsberg’s classic study (Ellsberg, 1961). However, to the best of our knowledge, we demonstrate
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for the first time that ambiguity has a remarkably different effect on behavior than known
probabilities in a realistic high-stakes scenario where probabilities are very small. In our
experiments individuals exhibit a stronger aversion to ambiguous than precise probabilities with
more individuals considering insurance and indicating a larger WTP for coverage when the risk is
ambiguous than when probabilities are specified precisely. Probabilities were not the primary
driver of this behavior. Rather we believe that people are cognizant of their difficulties in judging
probabilities of very rare events and hence tend to ignore their own probability judgments when
deciding about the purchase of insurance. An alternative explanation that ambiguity leads to
higher worry can be ruled out by looking at table 4. Worry is not higher on average in our
treatments with ambiguity than with known probabilities.

Implications, limitations, and future research
We ran a laboratory experiment with the aim of implementing a real-life risk with highstakes monetary consequences. Although we feel that our experimental design has the advantage
of coming quite close to an actual protective decision for a low-probability-high consequence
event, we are aware that generalizations based on laboratory evidence must be qualified even
though our findings of extreme responses with many individuals having a WTP = 0 and many
having a large WTP are supported by McClelland et al. (1993) in the laboratory and Kunreuther
(1978) in the field.
Another potential limitation of our design is that individuals did not lose their own money
and had the potential of gaining additional funds. We did our best to ensure that the loss was
perceived as a real one: Individuals received pictures of the painting and the sculpture; there was
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real money at stake that was ‘attached’ to those objects and the person had the option to purchase
insurance against a large loss. We also discussed the situation with each group after the
experiment and their comments indicated that they had framed the problem as a potential loss
rather than as a lottery. Hence, we feel that we have been successful in implementing a large
stakes insurance experiment.
Our findings suggest that insurers can charge a premium considerably in excess of
expected loss when probabilities are extremely low and still generate considerable demand for
coverage. Interest in terrorism insurance coverage at extremely high prices supports this finding
(General Accounting Office, 2002). For low-probability-high consequence events, consumer
unions or financial test magazines might consider informing people about how to compute the
expected loss so that comparisons between the actual premium and an actuarially fair one could
be made.
Insurers could also be expected to take advantage of their knowledge that ambiguous
probabilities lead to higher WTP than well-specified estimates when the likelihood of the event
occurring is very small. This may be a principal reason why one rarely learns about the chances
of making a claim at the time one purchases a policy. Future research might also want to look at a
comparison of large known and ambiguous probabilities in a realistic large stakes scenario to
complete the picture.
Not only insurers but also other companies or institutions such as politicians and the
media who are interested in changing behavior may find ways to stir up individuals’ worries,
sometimes for their own benefit but also for the benefit of those at risk. One current example
where generating worry by the media has changed behavior is the swine flu concerns of 2009
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where the probability of an infection was originally highly uncertain and one rarely obtained
estimates of the probabilities and consequences of the illness. In the early phase of pandemic, the
media succeeded in stirring up worries by those residing in many countries (e.g., BBC News, July
19, 2009), leading to calls for and large stake government purchases of vaccinations against the
swine flu. Later, however, the risks of the swine flu became more transparent but there was now
increasing uncertainty and worry about the side effects of the vaccinations, again stirred by the
media (Focus Online, November 11, 2009). As a result, many people decided against vaccination
and there was an oversupply of vaccinations in some countries such as Germany. Stirring up
worry by the media apparently had a strong influence on the behavior of people.
Future research would benefit not only from manipulating the degree of worry in the
laboratory but also by measuring the different dimensions of worry that are evoked by exposing
individuals to different scenarios. In this way we would increase our understanding as to what
makes individuals worry about one risk but not another. Future research might also want to look
more closely at ‘trait’-like concepts such as optimism and pessimism etc. (Einhorn & Hogarth,
1985).
Special consideration should also be given to the decision processes of individuals who
decide not to even consider insurance. As Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein (1981) noted "people
often attempt to reduce the anxiety generated in the face of uncertainty by denying the
uncertainty, thus making the risk seem so small it can safely be ignored […]." (p.160). Although
we would expect that worry is an even more accurate term for the emotion invoked with respect
to potential high-stakes losses, the rationale and findings of the experiments reported in this paper
are consistent with their view. Individuals with low levels of worry have a high propensity not to
protect themselves. For these individuals, there is no monetary incentive for purchasing
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insurance. Hence, subsidies reducing the insurance premium may not be expected to work since
they are not willing to even pay a penny for insurance. However, for those individuals deserving
special treatment such as low income individuals, insurance stamps (like food stamps) might be
provided for equity reasons; and for risks that have negative externalities when people fail to
purchase insurance, such as disaster relief provided to uninsured flood victims, it may be
necessary to require coverage for all those residing in these hazard-prone areas. (Kunreuther &
Michel-Kerjan, in press).
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Table 1: Experimental design (Group 3, Part A not analyzed in this contribution)

Group
1
(n=87)
Between
subjects

Group
2
(n=81)
Group
3
(n=86)

Within-subjects
Part A of experiment:
Part B of experiment:
inherited painting
inherited sculpture
Rain frequencies in July and
Two precise risks each with
August each with probability of 1
probability of 1 in 10,000 –
in 10,000 – separate insurance
separate insurance policies for
policies for each risk
each risk
Rain frequencies in July and
Two precise risks each with
August each with probability of 1
probability of 1 in 10,000 – one
in 10,000 – one insurance policy
insurance policy
for both risks
for both risks
Rain frequencies July and August
Rain frequencies in July and
each with probability 1 in 10,000 –
August each with probability of 1
first insurance sold before second
in 10 – separate insurance
policies for each of the risks
risk introduced

Table 2: Distribution of WTP for insurance
WTP = 0

0 < WTP 
10*E(loss)

Percentage

Percentage

WTP > 10*E(Loss)
Percentage

Mean

Std. Dev.

Mean/
E(Loss)

Ambiguity
17 %
2%
81 %
235 DM2) 310 DM
588
and low risk
(1/5000)1)
Known low
315
35 %
8%
57 %
126 DM2) 198 DM
risk
2)
(1/5000)
Ambiguity
16 %
84 %
and high risk
3)
(1/5)
1) Groups 1A and 2A, N=168. Expected value of loss was 0.4DM. WTP did not
significantly differ between groups.
2) Groups 1B and 2B, N=168. Expected value of loss was 0.4DM. WTP did not
significantly differ between groups.
3) Group 3B, N=86. Expected value of loss was 380DM. Mean WTP is 215DM, standard
deviation is 294 DM.
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Table 3: WTP = 0 on an individual level

WTP=0

Ambiguity

Exact probabilities
WTP >0

Sum

WTP = 0
WTP > 0

28
31

1
108

29
139

Sum

59

109

168

Table 4: Mean levels of worry
Ambiguity and low risk
(1 / 5000 )

Known low risk
(1 / 5000)

Ambiguity and high risk
(1 / 5)

WTP = 0
WTP > 0

2.6
5.0

3.8
5.3

2.2
4.9

Average

4.6

5.0

4.0

Pr (|T| > |t|)

0.00

0.05

0.00

Table 5: Mean probability judgments
Ambiguity and low risk
(1 / 5000)

Ambiguity and high risk
(1 / 5)

WTP = 0
WTP > 0

1 / 25
1 / 14

1/7
1/7

Average

1 / 15

1/7

Pr (|T| > |t|)

0.14

0.81
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Table 6: Pearson correlation coefficients between probability judgment and worry

WTP = 0
WTP > 0

Ambiguity and low risk
(1 / 5000)

Ambiguity and high risk
(1 / 5)

0.13 (0.54)
0.03 (0.69)

-0.36 (0.27)
0.14 (0.25)

0.07 (0.36)
0.05 (0.65)
Average
Note: Significance levels are reported in parentheses.

Table 7: Threshold model estimation results for insurance against disasters with large and small
ambiguous probabilities
considering insurance
WTP if considering insurance
1a
1b
1c
2a
2b
2c
Coeff.
Coeff.
Coeff.
Coeff.
Coeff.
Coeff.
(Std. Err.)
(Std. Err.)
(Std. Err.)
(Std. Err.)
(Std. Err.)
(Std. Err.)
1.0
(0.9) 1.0
(1.0) 316*
(167) 280*
(165)
0.2*** (0.0) 0.2*** (0.0) 22*** (7) 21*** (8)
-0.3
(0.2) -0.2
(0.2) -0.3
(0.3) -84
(53) -90*
(51) -87*
(52)

x1 (prob)
x2 (worry)
x4 (separate
policies)
x5 (high
-0.1
(0.3) -0.2
(0.2) -0.2
(0.3) -44
(52) -26
(50) -49
(51)
risk)
Constant
1.1*** (0.2) 0.4*
(0.2) 0.5** (0.2) 250*** (39) 162*** (51) 147*** (53)
Model
diagnostics
#
243
254
243
208
212
208
observations
R2++
0.01
0.10
0.09
0.02
0.04
0.05
Prob > chi2 0.40
0.00
0.00
Log
-100
-104
-93
likelihood
AIC
209 (df=4)
216 (df=4)
195 (df=5)
* denotes marginal significance at 90% confidence
** denotes significance at 95% confidence
*** denotes significance at 99% confidence
+
The number of observations is not twice the number of individuals because there are some missing values for
the level of worry and the probability estimates in part A of the experiment.
++ Pseudo R2 for regression on a and adjusted R2 for regression on y.
Reference categories: joint policies (x4) and low risk (x5).
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Table 8: Threshold model estimation results for insurance against disasters with small known
probabilities
considering
insurance

x2 (worry)
x4 (separate policies)
Constant

Coeff.
(Std. Err.)
0.3***
(0.1)
-0.1
(0.2)
-0.6*** (0.2)

WTP if
considering
insurance
Coeff.
(Std. Err.)
17***
(6)
-35
(36)
45
(40)

Model diagnostics
# observations
167
108
++
R2
0.2
0.06
Prob > chi2
0.00
Log likelihood
-87
AIC1)
180 (df=3)
* denotes marginal significance at 90% confidence
** denotes significance at 95% confidence
*** denotes significance at 99% confidence
+
The number of observations is not twice the number of
individuals because there are some missing values for the level
of worry and the probability estimates in part A of the
experiment.
++ Pseudo R2 for regression on a and adjusted R2 for regression
on y
1) The AIC criterion is based on log likelihood but also punishes
model complexity.

Table 9: Impact of worry on average WTP with small exact and ambiguous probabilities
Mean WTP for insurance in DM
Small exact probabilities
Worry
No/Very low
Low
High
Extremely/Very high
ANOVA: F-value (sig., 2-sd.)

n=165
7
54
148
236
9.621 (.000)

Small ambiguous
probabilities
n=168
102
120
278
495
8.96 (.000)
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Appendix

A.1 Experimental Instructions (translations of parts A and B of the experiment)

Group 1 (separate policies)
Part A: Ambiguity
 You inherited a small painting and have received a photograph of it. The photo carries an
individual identification number. You do not know if the painting is an original or a
reproduction. If it is an original it is worth 2,000 DM. If it is a reproduction it is worth
nothing.
 One person in the entire group of respondents participating in our experiment (about 260 to
280 people) has an original painting. All others have reproductions. Which one of the
paintings is the original will be determined by a random draw symbolizing the decision of an
art appraiser at the end of the entire experiment. The person who has the original painting will
actually receive the value of the painting: 2,000 DM (in real bills!).
 Theft and fire threaten your painting.
 Whether or not the painting will be stolen will be determined by the weather conditions in
July. If it will rain on 24 days in July (not more but also not less), a theft will occur. More
precisely, the painting will be stolen if the weather station at the Frankfurt Airport will report
on exactly 24 days of rain. A day is defined as a rainy day if there is at least 1 mm of rain on
this day.
 The weather conditions in August determine if a fire will destroy the painting. If it will rain on
23 days in August (not more but also not less), a fire will occur. More precisely, a fire will
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destroy the painting if the weather station at the Frankfurt Airport will report exactly 23 days
of rain. Here again a day is defined as a rainy day if there is at least 1 mm of rain on this day.
 You can buy insurance policies against either each or both of these risks. If you have an
insurance policy against theft or fire and the painting will be stolen or destroyed by fire,
respectively, the insurance will reimburse you for the loss of 2,000 DM. If you have an
insurance policy against fire and the painting will be destroyed by fire, the insurance will
reimburse you for the value of 2,000 DM.
 The insurance company will sell the insurance policy and charge the money for it only in case
an art appraiser, represented by the random draw of the experimenter, finds out that your
painting is an original. Thus, for all respondents having the reproduction the payments for the
insurance policies will remain hypothetical. However, for the one having the original painting
they will become true and have to be paid from his or her own money.

The selling procedure for the theft insurance policy is organized in the following way:
 Before the experiment, the experimenter selected a secret selling price for the theft insurance
policy. He or she wrote it on a piece of paper and put it into the envelope on the front desk.
 You are now required to write a buying price equal to your maximum willingness to pay for
the theft insurance policy on the form in front of you and to put it in the respective envelope.
 After the experiment, the experimenter will open the envelope with the selling price. If your
buying price is equal to or higher than the secret selling price you will have bought or are able
to buy the theft insurance policy should you be the person with the original painting.(if you are
the one who has the original painting). If your buying price is lower than the secret price, you
are not able to buy the theft insurance policy.
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 Note that you have no information about the selling price for the theft insurance policy. The
experimenter changes this price every time.
 In this situation, the best you can do is to state your true value, your maximum willingness to
pay for the theft insurance policy.
 It does not make sense to state a buying price higher than your maximum willingness to pay
since you may end up paying this high price.
 It does also not make sense to state a price lower than your maximum willingness to pay. If
your stated price is lower than the selling price but you, in fact, would have been willing to
pay that price you may end up without the theft insurance policy even if you would have liked
to buy it for that price if you are the one who has the original painting.
 If you do not want to buy the theft insurance policy please state 0 DM on the respective form.
 Please do not announce your buying price to the others and do not raise questions that allow
the other participants to guess your buying price.
 Again, note that you only have to actually pay the price for the insurance policy if you are the
one who has the original painting. This is because the insurance company will only sell the
insurance policy if the painting is verified as the original. In this case, the person who has the
original painting is able to buy insurance. He or she has to pay for the coverage of the
insurance policies from his or her own money.
 Basically, that means that you are buying insurance for the original and that you only pay for it
in case you have it.
 Now, please put the form with your maximum buying price in the appropriate envelope and
hand it over to the experimenter.
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The selling procedure for the fire insurance policy is organized the following way:
 The selling procedure of the fire insurance policy is organized in exactly the same way as the
selling procedure for the theft insurance policy, i.e. again there is a secret selling price in an
envelope, and you again are supposed to state your maximum buying price.
 Now, please put the form with your maximum buying price in the appropriate envelope and
hand it over to the experimenter.

Part B: Risk
 You inherited a small sculpture and have received a photograph of it. The photo carries an
individual identification number. You do not know if the sculpture is an original or a
reproduction. If it is an original it is worth 2,000 DM. If it is a reproduction it is worth
nothing.
 One person in the entire group of respondents participating in our experiment (about 260 to
280 people) has an original sculpture. All others are reproductions. Which one of the
sculptures is the original will be determined by a random draw symbolizing the decision of an
art appraiser at the end of the entire experiment. The person who has the original sculpture
will actually receive the value of the sculpture: 2,000 DM.
 Theft and fire threaten your sculpture. Both risks have a known chance of occurrence:
Hazard

Chance of occurrence

Theft

in one of 10.000 cases

Fire

in one of 10.000 cases
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 A bingo cage with 100 balls will be used to determine whether or not the sculpture will be
stolen and whether or not it will be destroyed by fire.
-

Whether or not the sculpture will be stolen will be determined by the following two-stage
procedure: If a ball with a number between 2 and 100 is drawn, no theft will have
occurred. We will continue drawing of the bingo cage with 100 balls after the first draw
only if a ball carrying the number 1 is drawn. Otherwise nothing happened. In a second
draw, another ball from the bingo cage with 100 balls will be taken. Theft occurs if the ball
with the number 1 is drawn in the second stage. The chance that both these events occur is
exactly 1 in 10,000.

-

Secondly we will determine the case if fire occurs. We will proceed with the same twostage procedure as used for the theft situation.

 You can buy insurance policies against either each or both of these risks. If you have an
insurance policy against theft or fire and the sculpture will be stolen or destroyed by fire,
respectively, the insurance will reimburse you for the loss of 2,000 DM. If you have an
insurance policy against fire and the fire destroys the sculpture, the insurance will reimburse
you for the value of 2,000 DM.
 The insurance company will sell the insurance policy and charge the money for it only in case
an art appraiser, represented by the random draw of the experimenter, finds out that the
sculpture is an original. Thus, for all respondents having the reproduction, the payments for
the insurance policies will remain hypothetical. However, for the one having the original
sculpture they will become true and have to be paid from his or her own money.
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The selling procedure for the theft insurance policy is organized the following way:
 The selling procedure of the theft insurance policy is organized in exactly the same way as the
selling procedure for the theft and fire insurance policies in the first part of the experiment, i.e.
there again is a secret selling price in an envelope, and you again are supposed to state your
maximum buying price.
 Now, please put the form with your maximum buying price in the appropriate envelope and
hand it over to the experimenter.

The selling procedure for the fire insurance policy is organized the following way:
 The selling procedure of the fire insurance policy is organized in exactly the same way as the
selling procedure for the theft and fire insurance policy in the first and the theft insurance
policy in the second part of the experiment, i.e. there again is a secret selling price in an
envelope, and you again are supposed to state your maximum buying price.
 Now, please put the form with your maximum buying price in the appropriate envelope and
hand it over to the experimenter.
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Group 2 (one policy)
The only difference between groups 1 and 2 was that in group 2 we sold bundled rather than
separate insurance in both parts A and B.
Therefore, the part of the instructions dealing with insurance was written up as follows in part A
(B) of the experiment:
 You can buy an insurance policy against each of these two risks. If you have an insurance
policy and your painting (sculpture) will be stolen or destroyed by fire, the insurance will
reimburse you for the loss of 2,000 DM.

Moreover, the selling procedure was described in the following way in part A (B) of the
experiment:
 Before the experiment, the experimenter selected a secret selling price for the insurance
policy. He or she wrote it on a piece of paper and put it into the envelope on the front desk.
 In the following you are required to write a buying price equaling your maximum willingness
to pay for the insurance policy on the form in front of you and to put it in the respective
envelope.
 After the experiment, the experimenter will open the envelope with the selling price. If your
buying price is equal to or higher than the secret selling price, you are able to buy the
insurance policy (in case you are the one who has the original painting (sculpture)). If your
buying price is lower than the secret price, you are not able to buy the insurance policy.
 Note that you have no information about the selling price for the insurance policy. The
experimenter changes this price every time.
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 In this situation, the best you can do is to state the true value of your maximum willingness to
pay for the insurance policy.
 It does not make sense to state a buying price higher than your maximum willingness to pay
since you may end up paying this high price.
 It does also not make sense to state a price lower than your maximum willingness to pay. If
your stated price is lower than the selling price but you in fact would have been willing to pay
that price you may end up without the insurance policy even if you would have liked to buy it
for that price if you are the one who has the original painting (sculpture).
 If you do not want to buy the insurance policy please state 0 DM on the respective form.
 Please do not announce your buying price to the other participants and do not raise questions
that allow others to guess your buying price.
 Again, note that you only have to actually pay the price for the insurance policy if you are the
one who has the original painting. This is because the insurance company will only sell the
insurance policy if the painting is verified as the original. In this case, the person who has the
original painting is able to buy insurance. He or she has to pay for the coverage of the
insurance policies from his or her own money.
 Basically that means that you are buying insurance for the original and that you only pay for it
in case you have it.
 Now, please put the form with your maximum buying price in the appropriate envelope and
hand it over to the experimenter.
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A.2: Probability table
Please report how probable you have judged „exactly 24 rain days in July“ occurring. Please
check an interval that covers the probability you are judging to be correct first. Afterwards please
report the exact probability in the right column.
Explanation: A chance of 1 in 1.000.000 implies that a July with exactly 24 rain days occurs – on
average – every 1.000.000 years.
Chance: 1 in
1 to 5
5 to 10
10 to 50
50 to 100
100 to 500
500 to 1.000
1.000 to 5.000
5.000 to 10.000
10.000 to 50.000
50.000 to 100.000
100.000 to 500.000
500.000 to 1.000.000
1.000.000 to 5.000.000
5.000.000 to 10.000.000
Less probable

Please
check:

Exactly:
1 in _______________
1 in _______________
1 in _______________
1 in _______________
1 in _______________
1 in _______________
1 in _______________
1 in _______________
1 in _______________
1 in _______________
1 in _______________
1 in _______________
1 in _______________
1 in _______________
Exactly 1 in _____________
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